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 I examine whether U.S. corporations can strategically organize global supply chains to 
achieve tax efficiency by creating or acquiring subsidiaries in Switzerland. In particular, I study 
if there is an association between a firm’s use of Swiss subsidiaries and the firm’s effective tax 
rate using a sample of firm years from 1998 to 2013. Under U.S. rules prior to the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), firms with subsidiaries in low-tax-rate foreign countries (e.g., 
Switzerland) could generally avoid U.S. tax on foreign income by not repatriating income. The 
2014 Caterpillar Inc. case study offers an example of how corporations may derive tax benefits 
from Swiss subsidiaries. Consistent with the implications of the case study and opportunities 
presented by pre-TCJA rules, I find that corporations with at least one Swiss subsidiary generally 
have lower effective tax rates than corporations without any subsidiaries in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, the degree of these effective tax rate effects vary by industry. I also analyze pre-tax 
supply chain costs (e.g., duties, tariffs, and transportation-type costs) and find that firms with at 
least one Swiss subsidiary have a lower average cost of goods sold divided by total assets ratio 
than the average ratio of firms without at least one Swiss subsidiary. This is consistent with the 
notion that analyzing supply chain tax efficiency must consider the net effects of pre-tax supply 
chain costs and tax liabilities. Broadly, my study contributes evidence of the value of studying 





While traditional supply chain management and tax planning are not typically evaluated 
in conjunction, taxes have a large effect on firms’ net income and thus may relatedly be a key 
element for consideration in supply chain management. This paper examines whether firms can 
strategically organize supply chains to achieve tax efficiency by creating or acquiring 
subsidiaries in Switzerland. More specifically, this paper examines if there is an association 
between a firm’s use of Swiss subsidiaries and the firm’s tax rate. If creating or acquiring Swiss 
subsidiaries is tax efficient, firms with Swiss subsidiaries are expected to have lower tax costs. 
Understanding the relation between taxes and supply chain costs is important for several 
reasons. First, following the rapid spread of COVID-19 in 2020, global supply chains were 
disrupted, leaving many companies with the difficult task of restructuring supply chains. Thus, it 
is beneficial to obtain a better understanding of how and why firms use certain multinational 
supply chains. Importantly, firms are unlikely to reveal explicit information on their supply chain 
strategy because it may be a source of competitive advantage or, alternatively, a source of risk. 
As such, this study aims to reveal potential consequences of one specific supply chain choice: the 
use of Swiss subsidiaries. Second, the world economy is continuing to grow and become 
increasingly interconnected. Consequently, more corporations will be able to leverage 
opportunities to optimize their business models through strategic tax and supply chain 
arrangements, underscoring the importance of understanding strategic supply chain management.  
I expect firms’ use of Swiss subsidiaries to reduce taxes for several reasons. Under U.S. 
rules prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), firms with subsidiaries in low-tax-rate 
foreign countries (e.g., Switzerland) could generally avoid U.S. tax on foreign income by not 
repatriating income. The Caterpillar Inc. case study, which I discuss later, offers an example of 
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how corporations can obtain tax benefits from Swiss subsidiaries. Therefore, I predict that U.S. 
corporations with at least one Swiss subsidiary will have a lower average effective tax rate 
(ETR) than U.S. corporations without any Swiss subsidiaries. Furthermore, the efficacy of tax 
efficient supply chains may vary by industry because some tax rules apply differently for certain 
industries such as manufacturing. Consequently, I will examine these dynamics separately for 
different industries. It is also important to consider pre-tax supply chain costs (e.g., duties, tariffs, 
and transportation-type costs) to assess the net effect of strategic supply chain decisions but due 
to a lack of transparency into potential pre-tax costs, I do not make predictions as to whether a 
Swiss subsidiary increases or decreases those costs.  
In order to test the effect of Swiss subsidiary ownership on firm tax liabilities, I analyze a 
sample of firm years from 1998-2013. Specifically, I use several multivariable linear regression 
models to examine the association between several different variables, including Swiss 
subsidiary usage, and ETR. Generally, I find that U.S. corporations with at least one Swiss 
subsidiary have lower average effective tax rates than U.S. corporations without any. This result 
is consistent with the inferences drawn from the Caterpillar Inc. case study and the findings of 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), which describe how U.S. multinational entities (MNEs) can derive 
tax benefits from situating subsidiaries in jurisdictions with low corporate income tax rates (e.g., 
Switzerland). Moreover, after stratifying by several business industries, I find that corporations 
in the “Personal and Business Services” industry with at least one Swiss subsidiary also have 
lower average effective tax rates than same-industry corporations without any. For corporations 
in the manufacturing industry, I am unable to obtain statistically significant evidence of an 
association between Swiss subsidiaries and ETRs. I also find evidence that Swiss subsidiary 
usage is negatively associated with cost of goods sold (COGS) but positive associated with 
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selling, general, and administrative expense (SG&A). Overall, these results support the notion 
that corporations can strategically manage global supply chains to achieve tax efficiency. More 
broadly, my study provides evidence of the value of studying corporations’ tax planning and 
supply chain management practices in conjunction.  
Background and Research Question 
Institutional Details – Overview of U.S. Corporate Tax System 
In the United States, the corporate income tax applies to C corporations, which are treated 
as taxable entities separate from their owners, who are known as shareholders. Under this type of 
organization, corporate income is taxed twice: once at the corporate level and then again at the 
individual-shareholder level when shareholders receive dividends or realize capital gains. On the 
other hand, other business entities, such as S corporations and partnerships, pass their income 
through the entity to the owners, who then pay taxes. Thus, these “pass-through” businesses only 
pay taxes on business income once at individual income tax rates (Congressional Research 
Service [CRS], 2020, p. 11). The corporate income tax liability can be calculated with the 
following general equation:  
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 = [(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 




Corporations may have a net operating loss (NOL), which occurs when expenses exceed 
total income in a given year. Losses arising after December 31, 2017 can be “carried forward” 
indefinitely and be used to offset future tax liability (IRC § 172(b)). The losses carried forward 
are generally limited to 80 percent of taxable income (CRS, 2020, p. 12; IRC § 172(a)).1 For 
 
1 Special tax laws related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) modified some of these rules. For purposes of this study, I 
ignore these special coronavirus-related rules. 
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losses arising prior to December 31, 2017, NOLs can offset 100 percent of taxable income and 
be carried backward for up to two years and forward for up to 20 years (Gale et al., 2018, p. 6). 
 In terms of taxation on foreign income, prior to 2017, American corporations were able to 
defer taxes on income earned by foreign subsidiaries until that income is repatriated to the 
United States.2 In these cases, firms pay tax at the rate of the foreign jurisdiction in which each 
subsidiary is located. Upon repatriation, U.S. tax is due if the foreign tax rate is below the U.S. 
tax rate, which was common throughout the 2000s and 2010s. In contrast, if the U.S. tax rate was 
below the foreign tax rate, the firm could receive foreign tax credits (FTCs) for the foreign tax 
paid and use these to offset the U.S. tax due on low-tax-rate foreign income.3 That said, if the 
U.S. firm never repatriates the foreign income, it never pays the additional U.S. tax that would be 
due upon repatriation of low-tax-rate foreign income.  
However, Subpart F income, which includes income such as interest, dividends, 
annuities, rents, and royalties (IRC § 952; IRC § 954), cannot be deferred and corporations must 
pay taxes on this type of income in the year it is earned, regardless of repatriation. The Subpart F 
rules exist to prevent corporations from transferring this type of taxable income from high-tax to 
low-tax jurisdictions to avoid U.S. income tax liability (CRS, 2016, p. 2). Thus, Subpart F 
income helps to mitigate profit shifting away from the United States. After 2017, the TCJA 
generally exempted the taxation of income upon repatriation, though retaining Subpart F, but 




2 The repatriation is executed through a dividend payment from a foreign subsidiary to the U.S. parent company. 
3 A full discussion of the operating of the FTC—which is much more complicated than this high-level discussion—
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Institutional Details – Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
The TCJA introduced significant, complex changes to the Internal Revenue Code, 
affecting a plethora of tax rules. Most of the non-corporate provisions expire after 2025 but the 
majority of the corporate provisions are permanent (Gale et al., 2018, p. 1). For instance, the 
TCJA reduced the statutory C corporation income tax rate from 35 to 21 percent (IRC § 11(b)). 
A key systemic change to U.S. international corporate income taxation was the shift from a 
hybrid-worldwide system to a hybrid-territorial system, a shift driven by the elimination of 
taxation on foreign income upon repatriation. Prior to the TCJA, the United States taxed 
corporations under a more worldwide (resident-based) tax system. A worldwide system means 
that a jurisdiction imposes tax on all income earned at home or abroad (CRS, 2016, p. 1). Under 
this system, a key issue is double taxation because the income would be taxed by both the 
jurisdiction in which the income was generated and the domestic jurisdiction. Double taxation is 
alleviated by FTCs (IRS, n.d., p. 5). In contrast, a territorial system imposes tax on income 
earned within the borders of the tax jurisdiction (CRS, 2016, p. 1). For example, if a U.S. 
company has a foreign subsidiary that earns income in Switzerland, in a territorial system the 
U.S. would generally not tax the income earned in Switzerland. It is important to note that no 
country uses a pure version of either of these two systems; jurisdictions use hybrid systems that 
combine worldwide and territorial system components (IRS, n.d., p. 6).  
Although pure versions of these systems are not used, it is worthwhile to discuss their 
business implications. In a pure worldwide tax system, taxes should play virtually no role in 
influencing geographic investment allocation because the income earned will be taxed using 
domestic rates regardless of location (“capital export neutrality”). Accordingly, situating 
operations in tax havens would have no direct tax benefits unless there are non-tax advantages 
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associated with the haven. This should theoretically incentivize corporations to direct 
investments to locations that would be most productive (CRS, 2016, p. 1). Alternatively, in a 
pure territorial system, tax considerations would play a role in global investment decisions 
because corporations only pay taxes on income earned in each jurisdiction the corporation is 
located in. This means that corporations would be taxed at the same rates as foreign competitors 
in the foreign market. In this way, a territorial system theoretically neutralizes tax disadvantages 
faced by an investor seeking to make a foreign investment, hence the terms “competitive 
neutrality” or “capital import neutrality.” However, territorial taxation systems are not neutral in 
reality because this system incentivizes investment in tax havens for multinational enterprises 
seeking to maximize net income by reducing tax liability (CRS, 2016, p. 2).4  
The TCJA made several significant additions and adjustments within the overarching 
systemic shift in the U.S. taxation system from hybrid-worldwide to hybrid-territorial, one of 
which was participation exemption or a dividends received deduction (DRD) for dividends from 
foreign subsidiaries. More specifically, “dividends paid to US corporate parents from non-
Subpart F income of their foreign subsidiaries are exempt from US tax” (Avi-Yonah, 2017, p.1). 
This exemption is a primary component of how the TCJA shifted the taxation system toward a 
more territorial system because it provides a full tax deduction for dividends that U.S. parents 
receive from foreign subsidiaries that are at least 10 percent owned (IRC § 245A(a)).5 This study 
 
4 Arguably, territorial taxation lead countries to engage in a “race to the bottom” in tax rates so as to attract 
investment from multinational corporations. 
5 The exemption applied prospectively, raising a question as to how existing, untaxed, unrepatriated earnings would 
be taxed. Exempting these was politically infeasible because it would be viewed as rewarding firms that appeared to 
be aggressively offshoring income under the old tax system. To address this, IRC § 965 treats the pre-existing 
deferred foreign income as Subpart F income. Specifically, in the foreign subsidiary’s last taxable year that begins 
before January 1, 2018, the foreign subsidiary’s Subpart F income will be increased by the greater of “1) the 
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income of such corporation determined as of November 2, 2017, or 2) the 
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income of such corporation determined as of December 31, 2017” (IRC § 
965(a)). The alternative dates were used to prevent firms from attempting to manipulate foreign earnings between 
the announcement and enactment of TCJA. The post-1986 period was selected because 1986 was the last major U.S. 
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does not analyze firm-year data following the TCJA due to a lack of data availability for years 
after 2013. However, the elimination of taxes on repatriated income and related shift toward a 
territorial system support the idea that certain firms may be further incentivized to situate 
subsidiaries in tax havens like Switzerland following 2017.  
As a counterbalance to participation exemption, the TCJA strengthened Subpart F by 
introducing a 10.5 percent tax on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) earned by U.S. 
parent companies’ controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) (IRC § 951A). A CFC is a foreign 
corporation if more than 50 percent of the voting power or value of all stock is owned by United 
States shareholders on any day of the foreign corporation’s taxable year (IRC § 957(a)). GILTI 
can be defined as the income that exceeds a 10 percent return on the CFC’s adjusted basis in 
tangible property (IRC § 951A(b)(2)). Specifically, GILTI is calculated as the total active 
income earned by a U.S. firm’s foreign affiliates that exceeds 10 percent of the firm’s foreign 
depreciable tangible property. Note that these calculations are based on aggregate amounts, not 
using country-by-country amounts, allowing firms to net high- and low-tax foreign income. A 
corporation (but not other businesses) can generally deduct 50 percent of the GILTI until 2025 
(37.5 percent after 2025) and claim a foreign tax credit for 80 percent of foreign taxes paid or 
accrued on GILTI (IRC § 250(a)). Thus, if the foreign tax rate is zero, the effective U.S. tax rate 
on GILTI will be 10.5 percent (half of the regular 21 percent corporate rate because of the 50 
percent deduction). If the foreign tax rate is 13.125 percent or higher, there will be no U.S. tax 
after the 80 percent credit for foreign taxes (Gale et al., 2018, pp. 6-7). 
Because GILTI exempts return on foreign tangible property, Avi-Yonah (2017) describes 
how the GILTI tax incentivizes movement of profits and jobs overseas to decrease GILTI tax 
 
tax reform which resulted in the tax system in place before TCJA. Corporations pay 15.5 percent tax on accumulated 
earnings and profits related to cash assets and 8 percent on other assets (IRC § 965(c)(1)).  
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liabilities by maximizing the exemption of the 10 percent return on foreign assets. For example, 
companies like Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others will be subject to more GILTI tax because 
their income is generated primarily through intangible assets, which consequently means that 
there will be a greater excess over the 10 percent basis in foreign tangible assets. In contrast, 
MNEs like General Electric or Caterpillar Inc. will pay less because their foreign operations 
require more tangible assets, decreasing the excess over the 10 percent basis (Avi-Yonah, 2017, 
pp. 4-5). As a result, companies like Apple could react by increasing tangible assets and 
employment overseas.  
Another crucial TCJA change is the creation of a base erosion anti-abuse tax (BEAT). 
This tax was implemented to help limit profit-shifting away from the United States by taxing 
deductible payments (e.g., interest, royalties, certain service payments), which are also known as 
base erosion payments, made to a foreign subsidiary (PWC, 2018, p. 1). Notably, however, the 
BEAT does not capture cost of goods sold payments to foreign entities as base erosion payments; 
COGS is the primary mechanism for firms to shift income through their supply chain. The BEAT 
is a minimum tax, applicable to large corporations (gross receipts over $500 million), on a base 
equal to taxable income without factoring in 1) the tax benefits arising from base erosion 
payments and 2) the base erosion percentage of any NOL allowed for the tax year (IRC § 
59A(c)(1)). As a minimum tax, the BEAT is calculated and compared to the corporation’s 
regular tax liability. If the BEAT is larger than the regular tax liability, the corporation pays its 
regular liability plus the difference so that the total tax equals the BEAT minimum tax 
calculation.6 The BEAT rate is five percent for tax years beginning in 2018, 10 percent for tax 
 
6 This calculation is similar to how the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) worked prior to being repealed 
by TCJA. Discussion of the AMT is beyond the scope of this study. 
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years beginning in 2019 to 2025, and 12.5 percent for years beginning after December 31, 2025 
(IRC § 59A(b)(2); PWC, 2018, p. 1).  
The TCJA also added new IRC section 250, which applies a reduced 13.125 percent to 
foreign derived intangible income (FDII), further addressing concerns about income shifting 
from the U.S. to foreign CFCs (Avi-Yonah, 2017, p. 5). That is, FDII is designed as an export 
incentive, to provide tax benefits for firms operating in the U.S. and selling their U.S. produced 
goods and services overseas. FDII represents “the amount which bears the same ratio to the 
deemed intangible income of such corporation as the foreign-derived deduction eligible income 
of such corporation, bears to the deduction eligible income of such corporation” (IRC § 
250(b)(1)). The share of the excess income allocated to the sale of goods and services abroad is 
taxed at a reduced rate. This tax rate reduction is achieved by allowing a FDII deduction of 37.5 
percent of the excess income (IRC § 250(a)(1)). Thus, the United States would tax this income at 
13.125 percent (i.e., 21 percent × (1—37.5 percent) = 13.125 percent) rather than the regular 21 
percent. After 2025, the FDII deduction drops to 21.875 percent (from 37.5 percent currently), 
which will raise the effective FDII tax rate to 16.4 percent (from 13.125 percent currently) (IRC 
§ 250(a)(3)(A)). Deemed intangible income is the excess of the U.S. parent corporation’s 
deduction eligible income (i.e., gross income without Subpart F income, GILTI, and other 
specified categories) over its deemed tangible income return (i.e., 10 percent of qualified 
business asset investment (QBAI)) (IRC § 250(b)(2), (3); Avi-Yonah, 2017, p. 5).  
Background Information 
 As the global economy continues to expand, MNEs are increasing their focus on how 
they can reduce costs through globalization. Rapid developments in technology (e.g. 
communication, transportation) and the simultaneous deterioration of trade barriers has 
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supported growing global economic interconnectivity (Webber, 2011, p. 149). While this trend 
has increased business opportunities, it has also enabled the shift of certain business activities 
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. These changes have led to a “race to the bottom” where 
some low-tax countries (e.g., Ireland, Switzerland) create attractive business tax environments to 
attract business, jobs, and income tax revenue. Simultaneously, there is concern from high-tax 
countries about losing these revenues to low-tax countries (Webber, 2011, p. 149). Supply chain 
management is one way that firms can shift income from high-tax to low tax countries. 
More broadly, supply chain tax practices force firms to focus on two factors: the arm’s 
length standard and business purpose doctrine (Webber, 2011, p. 150). The arm’s length standard 
describes how transactions between a parent company and its subsidiary should not be 
preferentially priced or conducted solely because they are related parties (IRS, 2015). Relatedly, 
the business purpose doctrine prevents businesses from undertaking transactions solely to reduce 
or avoid taxes (Webber, 2011, p. 150).  
Despite these limitations, it is evident that one key benefit arising from restructuring 
supply chains is a reduction in income tax liabilities (Webber 2011, p. 150). Reduction of pre-tax 
costs has been a common focus for many years in supply chain literature but there has been an 
increasing emphasis on how strategies to maximize net income (i.e., after taxes) can be 
interwoven with supply chain restructuring decisions (Webber, 2011, pp. 149-150). Both supply 
chain management and international tax planning share a major decision area, which involves 
selecting where to locate operations. This location decision can impact both pre-tax costs and tax 
obligations. It is important to note that the complete picture of supply chain efficiency must 
include an assessment of supply chain costs (e.g., duties, tariffs, distribution expenses) in 
addition to taxes (Webber 2011, pp. 150-151). If the net effect of tax benefits and supply chain 
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costs on profits is negative, the goals of an efficient supply chain strategy have not been met. As 
such, these pre-tax supply chain costs and tax benefits should ideally be analyzed in tandem: 
“Low tax rates become particularly attractive when products are profitable and the tax savings 
are not offset by supply chain costs” (Webber 2011, p. 151).  
Caterpillar Inc. Case Study Overview 
A tax strategy used by Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a staple American manufacturer of 
construction equipment, power generators, and sophisticated engines, provides a recent example 
of how tax efficient supply chain management can decrease U.S. tax liability (Senate, 2014, p. 
1). Before delving into the details of the strategy, it is important to understand the circumstances 
that enabled Caterpillar to leverage this strategy. Caterpillar provides aftermarket services for 
equipment that it sells. In particular, its 24-hour replacement part delivery gives the company a 
sharp competitive advantage. Prior to 1999, the finished-parts portion of Caterpillar’s business 
was operated out of Morton, Illinois and the company directly owned all the parts in the Morton, 
IL warehouse (Avi-Yonah, 2014, p. 5). Accordingly, all profits from the parts business were 
taxed by the United States regardless of whether sales were made overseas or domestically.7  
Around 1999, Caterpillar paid over $55 million to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to 
formulate a strategy explicitly intended to reduce Caterpillar’s U.S. effective tax rate, which 
involved establishing a Swiss subsidiary, Caterpillar SARL (CSARL), as a global purchaser of 
Caterpillar’s third party manufactured replacement parts (Senate, 2014, p. 4). This subsidiary 
enabled Caterpillar to record non-U.S. parts sales in Switzerland rather than in the U.S., 
significantly lowering the company’s tax expenses as follows (Senate, 2014, p. 4). First, 
following its inception, CSARL took ownership of the parts inventory at the Morton location. If 
 
7 Under the TCJA, this type of sales would be eligible for the FDII deduction. However, only income above a 10 
percent return on assets is eligible, so it is not clear that Caterpillar would have benefitted from FDII had it existed. 
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parts were to be sold in the U.S. market, they would be sold to the parent Caterpillar with no 
price markup (i.e., no profit to CSARL but the ultimate sale by the parent to a third-party would 
be fully taxed in the U.S.). In contrast, if the parts were designated for foreign sales, CSARL 
would sell them to independent dealers at a gain, allowing CSARL to capture the bulk of profits 
in Switzerland rather than in the U.S. (Avi-Yonah, 2014, p. 6). As mentioned previously, those 
profits would then be taxed at considerably lower rates. Caterpillar successfully negotiated with 
Switzerland for an effective tax rate between four and six percent (Senate, 2014, p. 4). Hence, 
from the period of 2000 to 2013, Caterpillar was able to redistribute over $8 billion in non-U.S. 
parts profits to Switzerland, deferring around $2.4 billion in U.S. taxes on those profits (Senate, 
2014, p. 6).8 Although this is only one example of a strategic supply chain arrangement that 
optimizes taxes, this case study clearly illustrates that Switzerland offers unique characteristics 
that allow firms to optimize their net income through supply chain decisions. As mentioned 
above, Caterpillar was able to negotiate preferential Swiss tax rates (i.e., four to six percent) but 
this does not alter the fact that Switzerland’s low corporate income tax rates provide an 
opportunity for tax savings. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine how ownership of a Swiss 
subsidiary affects other MNEs’ effective tax rates, on average across a broad sample, and if there 
is any substantive relationship between these variables. 
While this is certainly a beneficial arrangement for Caterpillar, it would be short-sighted 
to ignore this strategy’s potential or real negative implications to the U.S. The U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations emphasizes that this activity shifted 85 percent or 
more of Caterpillar’s non-U.S. replacement parts profits away from the United States to 
Switzerland (Senate, 2014, pp. 5-6). Clausing (2016) writes, “Reduced revenues from one source 
 
8 $2.4 billion equals the $8 billion profit times 30 percent, the difference between the U.S. statutory rate at that time 
(35 percent) and the approximate tax already paid to Switzerland (approximately five percent). 
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must be compensated for by higher tax revenues from other sources, or lower government 
spending, or increased budget deficits” (p. 1). The Caterpillar case clearly represents a detriment 
to the United States because of the previously listed factors but Switzerland most likely benefited 
from the 85 percent of profits diverted to it through CSARL. Thus, it is quite difficult to analyze 
the net global effects of shifting tax revenue from one nation to another. 
 Furthermore, Senate (2014) and Avi-Yonah (2014) both posit that this strategy has 
neither valid business purpose nor economic substance. According to IRC § 7701(o)(1), 
economic substance is determined if “A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart 
from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and B) the taxpayer has a 
substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.” 
Senate (2014) writes that even though there was a significant decrease in tax liability and the 
CSARL transaction made changes on paper, there were no actual changes in Caterpillar’s 
functions as they relate to the replacement parts business (p. 73). Relatedly, although CSARL 
was very profitable, there is no clear logic for creating the subsidiary besides its ability to shift 
tax liabilities to Switzerland and subsequently decrease Caterpillar’s taxes (Avi-Yonah, 2014, p. 
9). Thus, the creation and operation of CSARL represents a change in form but not substance. 
This concept is further accentuated by issues of how international tax strategies like Caterpillar’s 
may be inconsistent with corporate social responsibility (CSR). Avi-Yonah (2014) argues that 
the underlying attitude behind this tactic initiates a negative cycle where MNEs prioritize 
competitiveness and shareholder value maximization over responsibility for sustaining society 
(pp. 28-29). These issues are crucial factors to consider in understanding tax efficient supply 
chains and their holistic effects not only on the businesses that implement them but also on other 




 Given the above discussions, firms can reduce tax liabilities by locating subsidiaries in 
Switzerland. Specifically, under the U.S. rules in place prior to the TCJA, firms with subsidiaries 
in foreign countries with low corporate tax rates (e.g., Switzerland) can avoid U.S. tax on the 
income by refraining from repatriating income, as long as the income is not Subpart F income. 
Thus, at the average Swiss tax rate of 22.75 percent over my sample period (i.e., 1998-2013), a 
U.S. firm operating in Switzerland could save 12.25 percent (35 percent U.S. tax rate – 22.75 
percent Swiss rate) by using a Swiss supply chain (Tax Foundation, n.d.). The Caterpillar case 
study offers an examination of the tax benefits that can be derived from Swiss subsidiaries. 
Caterpillar strategically restructured its replacement parts supply chain using CSARL, enabling 
the shift of profits to Switzerland, a country with which Caterpillar had negotiated preferential 
tax rates. The four to six percent rate was quite low even after considering Switzerland’s status 
as a tax haven. Regardless, even if other corporations did not negotiate for even lower tax rates, 
Switzerland still possesses favorable tax rates that can enable MNEs to reduce their overall tax 
liabilities and maximize net income. Accordingly, I predict that U.S. corporations which possess 
at least one Swiss subsidiary will generally have a lower average ETR than U.S. corporations 
without any Swiss subsidiaries. That said, there is no information in the Caterpillar case study 
about the net effect of this supply chain decision when pre-tax supply chain costs are considered. 
Moreover, there are barriers to analyzing these costs, the most significant of which include a lack 
of data availability and disclosure transparency. Thus, while I examine proxies for other supply 
chain costs (e.g. cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expense), I do not 




The effectiveness of tax efficient supply chain strategies is also at least partially dictated 
by a business’ industry. For example, sales companies seem to have limited potential to generate 
tax benefits because they need a local presence in order to complete larger volumes of sales. 
When sales volume is large, the retailer prefers to develop a sales division or subsidiary in the 
foreign country to serve local customers because it is often more logistically efficient. This in 
turn fulfills the conditions for “permanent establishment” and introduces local income tax 
liability (Webber, 2011, pp. 159-162).9 While there are varying interpretations of what 
constitutes permanent establishment, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) interpretation is widely used. According to OECD (2017), a permanent 
establishment is defined as “a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partly carried on” (p. 8).  
In contrast, manufacturing organizations are better positioned to gain benefits from tax 
efficient supply chains. Webber (2011) describes, “most businesses prefer to concentrate 
manufacturing resources and limit the number of manufacturing sites. This makes the selection 
of manufacturing sites a particularly important task” (p. 162). From the tax side, the 
manufacturing process engages technology, skills, and fixed assets, which creates “business 
substance that international tax laws generally support” (Webber, 2011, p. 162). More 
specifically, according to Foreign Base Company Sales Income (2020) and IRM § 4.61.7.10 
(2006), income from the sale of goods manufactured in the country of the foreign subsidiary’s 
incorporation does not qualify as Subpart F income and thus is not taxed immediately. 
Consequently, the tax on the foreign income would be deferred until repatriation under the pre-
TCJA rules, or, under post-TCJA rules, be subject to a GILTI tax or no taxation through the 
 
9 When sales are relatively low in quantity, businesses are able to sell their products through distributors. This means 
the MNE has no legal presence in the other country and consequently does not need to pay taxes on income. 
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participation exemption (Tax Policy Center, 2020). This manufacturing exception was 
accentuated by a 2009 regulation change: “A CFC can qualify for the manufacturing exception if 
it meets one of three tests. The first two [are] physical manufacturing tests: the substantial 
transformation test and the substantial activity test. The third test [is] the substantial contribution 
test” (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010, p. 38). The substantial contribution test allows CFCs 
to qualify for the manufacturing exception by simply demonstrating that it had made a 
“substantial contribution” to the goods being sold as opposed to needing to demonstrate 
performance of a “physical” manufacturing activity (Senate, 2014, pp. 14-15). The details of the 
substantial contribution test are outside the scope of this study, but this change is noteworthy 
because it made claiming the manufacturing exception much easier for foreign subsidiaries. The 
potential for tax efficiency through manufacturing companies can be illustrated in Webber’s 
(2011) example of an MNE that manufactures, distributes, and sells products in three different 
countries. Through transfer pricing that abides by both the arm’s length principle and business 
purpose doctrine, earnings and risk can be allocated across these three locations such that the 
most profitable location is the one situated in a tax haven and also the primary risk-bearer. This 
location is often the manufacturing and/or intellectual property (IP) holder. The result of such an 
arrangement is maximum tax savings that are both not visible to and shielded from foreign tax 
jurisdictions (Webber, 2011, p. 163). Thus, I predict that U.S. manufacturing corporations with at 
least one Swiss subsidiary will have a lower average effective tax rate than U.S. manufacturing 
corporations without any Swiss subsidiaries.  
 Procurement organizations are another business type that can reap benefits from tax 
efficient supply chain strategies. Irving et al. (2005) note that, “it is possible for companies to 
centralize their procurement functions, proprietary procurement processes, and know-how into 
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specific corporate entities in low-tax jurisdictions” (p. 59). However, this ability is conditional on 
certain factors. In the case of U.S. tax law prior to the changes accompanying the TCJA, if the 
procurer is located in the same country where it purchases or sells goods, the local income tax 
rate applies (Webber, 2011, p. 165). This means that if the procurement organization is located in 
a tax haven, the desired tax benefits would be received. In contrast, if the procurer is in one 
country while the firm’s purchasing and selling activity occurs in another, the U.S. tax rate 
would apply, resulting in no tax savings.  
Data and Methodology 
I obtain financial data from Compustat databases covering firm-year information across 
the years 1998 to 2013. I require that the firm-years be public by requiring a market value of 
equity from each observation. I use information from the years 1998-2013 because these are the 
years that subsidiary information is available from Scott Dyreng’s website. As with most tax 
studies, I include only profitable firm-years, because tax rates are difficult to interpret for loss 
firms. Finally, to ensure that firm-years are subject to the same U.S. rules, I require that 
firm-years be incorporated in the U.S. This yields a maximum of 55,221 firm-year observations, 
but my analyses sometimes use fewer observations when specific variables are missing or 
additional conditions are set.  
It is important to acknowledge that one of the key limitations of this study is that 
Compustat only provides aggregate data. As mentioned earlier, analysis of the tax efficiency of 
international supply chains should contain calculations of net effects that encapsulate both pre-
tax supply chain costs such as duties, tariffs, and transportation-type costs, and tax liabilities 
directly related to the supply chain. This yields a more comprehensive understanding of whether 
or not a supply chain arrangement ultimately produces meaningful financial benefits for the 
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MNE. Due to a lack of data availability and transparency however, there is no direct way to 
distinguish the amounts specifically related to the supply chain from their associated aggregate 
amounts related to all of the firm’s operations. Some firms may bundle supply chain costs into 
cost of goods sold (COGS) and/or selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. 
 Before discussing the findings of the multivariable regressions with regards to the 
primary research question, I can make some important observations from comparisons of 
summary statistics between firms with and without at least one Swiss subsidiary. In particular, 
variables inspected include average effective tax rate (ETR), size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), return on assets (ROA), deferred foreign taxes (txdfo), and whether or not a firm has a net 
operating loss (NOL_Dum). After running independent t-tests comparing these means to 
determine if there are differences based on ownership of a Swiss subsidiary, the results show that 
companies with Swiss subsidiaries are statistically significantly larger, as measured by size 
(7.952±0.026), than those without any Swiss subsidiaries (6.077±0.010), t = –54.6002, p = 0. 
Based on these results, it is possible that larger firms are more likely to possess the resources and 
incentives to leverage their supply chains in a tax efficient manner through the use of Swiss 
subsidiaries. This result is consistent with the findings of Rego (2003), who found that “firms 
with greater pre-tax income [have] more incentives and resources to engage in tax planning” (p. 
805). 
In order to test the hypothesis of this study, I use various multivariable linear regression 
models. The first regression model used assesses how ETR is impacted by the following 
variables: Swiss, NonSwiss_HAVEN, size, roa, NOL_Dum, mnc, PPE_PCT, and rd. Variables 
and their definitions are denoted in Table 1. The results of the regression model (2) are tabulated 




𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎










The resulting coefficient for Swiss is –0.0101 and statistically significant, with a t-value of –2.33 
and p-value of 0.020. This demonstrates that corporations with a Swiss subsidiary (i.e. a 1 
returned for the Swiss variable) have an average effective tax rate approximately 1.01 percent 
lower than the average rate for corporations without any (i.e. a 0 returned for the Swiss variable), 
which is consistent with my hypothesis that corporations with at least one Swiss subsidiary will 
have lower average effective tax rates than corporations without any Swiss subsidiaries. To a 
slightly greater extent, the coefficient for NonSwiss_HAVEN also demonstrates the potential for 
subsidiaries located in other tax haven countries to reduce the parent company’s effective tax 
rate. Specifically, the coefficient for NonSwiss_HAVEN is –0.0133 with a t-value and p-value of 
–4.40 and 0.000 respectively, which demonstrate statistical significance. These results align with 
the findings of Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). They found that from around 1995-2007, U.S. MNEs 
with disclosed material operations in at least one tax haven country had an average worldwide 
tax rate on global income that is roughly 1.5 percent lower than those without operations in at 
least one tax haven country (Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009, pp. 1286-1287).  
I use additional multivariable regression models to test this study’s hypothesis in samples 
stratified by business industry. First, I examine firm-years in Fama and French 30 industry 22, 
“Personal and Business Services.” Examples of businesses in industry 22 include Florists’ 
Transworld Delivery (FTD) LLC, which is a floral wire service, retailer, and wholesaler; AFA 
Protective Systems Inc., which designs, installs, and services a variety of safety and surveillance 
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related systems (e.g., fire alarms, burglar alarms, CCTV systems); and Ackerley Group Inc., a 
media and entertainment company. I estimate equation (3) separately for industry 22 using the 
same explanatory variables as equation (2), excluding industry fixed effects, and the results of 
the regression are illustrated in Table 5. 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎







As depicted, the Swiss coefficient is –0.0280 and statistically significant, with t- and p-values of 
–2.39 and 0.017 respectively. The negative coefficient value shows that corporations in the 
“Personal and Business Services” industry with a Swiss subsidiary have an average effective tax 
rate approximately 2.80 percent lower than the average tax rate of industry corporations without 
at least one Swiss subsidiary. Based on these results, firms that provide personal and business 
services and have at least one Swiss subsidiary are generally more optimally positioned to reap 
tax benefits in comparison to the broader firm sample. This finding agrees with comments made 
by Webber (2011) regarding service providers’ ability to leverage supply chain management and 
tax planning: “Shared service providers are another good opportunity… It makes sense to 
consider income tax rates when determining where to locate these activities” (p. 167). Unlike the 
base model however, it is unclear whether industry 22 firms with subsidiaries in non-Swiss tax 
havens experience decreased effective tax rate effects as shown in the base model. The 
NonSwiss_HAVEN coefficient is -0.0008 and not statistically significant, with a t-value of –0.08 
and p-value of 0.933.  
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 I also test firm-years in the manufacturing industry, which span many different FF30 
classifications. Consequently, I stratify the sample by identifying which firms are classified as 
manufacturers using the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual.10 To create a manufacturing industry subsample, I create 
the variable manufacturingco and set it to one whenever a firm has an SIC code that falls into the 
code ranges classified under Division D: Manufacturing in OSHA’s SIC Manual. I estimate 
equation (4) separately for the manufacturing industry using the same explanatory variables as 
equation (2) and (3). Regression results for (4) are displayed in Table 5.  
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎







The coefficient for Swiss is 0.0037 but this result is statistically insignificant with a t-value of 
0.56 and p-value of 0.577. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn about my hypothesis that U.S. 
manufacturing corporations with at least one Swiss subsidiary have a lower average effective tax 
than U.S. manufacturing corporations without any Swiss subsidiaries. One of the potential 
reasons behind these inconclusive results is the sheer breadth of firms that are considered a part 
of the manufacturing industry. According to OSHA’s SIC Manual, there are 20 diverse 
establishment groups that compose Division D: Manufacturing, including manufacturers of food, 
textiles, chemicals, furniture, industrial and commercial machinery, computers, and much more. 
While these groups are all classified as manufacturing corporations, there are likely differences 
in the way these entities utilize or do not utilize Swiss subsidiaries. Specifically, some groups 
 
10 Available at https://www.osha.gov/data/sic-manual 
23 
 
may be better positioned or possess greater incentives to qualify for the aforementioned 
manufacturing exception, which would potentially enable corporations in these groups to obtain 
tax benefits. It is important to note that the coefficient for NonSwiss_Haven is –0.0222 and 
statistically significant, with a t-value of –4.15 and p-value of 0.000. This finding suggests that 
manufacturing corporations with foreign subsidiaries in non-Swiss tax havens have an average 
ETR that is around 2.22 percent lower than the average ETR of manufacturing corporations 
without any foreign subsidiaries in non-Swiss tax havens.  
 In addition to predicting effective tax rate, it is valuable to analyze the relation between 
whether or not an MNE has a Swiss subsidiary and pre-tax supply chain costs. COGS and SG&A 
are divided by total assets to reduce the influence of variations in firm size and consequently 
facilitate interpretation. I perform the following regression analyses on the firm-year sample:  
 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆_𝐴𝑇 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎











𝑆𝐺𝐴_𝐴𝑇 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎










Although there are important limitations in the aforementioned lack of transparency and use of 
aggregate data that may influence regression results, I find that firms with at least one Swiss 
subsidiary have a lower average COGS divided by total assets ratio (COGS_AT) than the 
COGS_AT ratio of firms without at least one Swiss subsidiary. As shown in Table 6, the results 
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of model (5) are statistically significant, indicating a Swiss coefficient of –0.0886 with a t-value 
of –2.79 and p-value of 0.005. This finding aligns with the idea that MNEs can derive pre-tax 
supply chain cost savings using Swiss subsidiaries in addition to the previously discussed tax 
benefits. In contrast, I find that firms with at least one Swiss subsidiary have a higher average 
SG&A divided by total assets ratio (SGA_AT) than the SGA_AT ratio of firms without at least 
one Swiss subsidiary. The results of (6) are shown in Table 7. Specifically, the Swiss coefficient 
is 0.1113 and statistically significant, with a t-value of 3.11 and p-value of 0.002. This positive 
coefficient means that model (6) estimates an increase in the SGA divided by total assets ratio if 
a firm possesses a foreign subsidiary in Switzerland. It is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons 
behind this inconsistency, but it is reasonable to infer that factors including varying firm 
classifications of supply chain costs into SG&A and COGS, a lack of transparency, and 
aggregate data use contribute to this result. It is also possible that gaining tax efficiency comes at 
the cost of increased administrative expenses. 
Conclusion 
This study presents evidence of tax efficient supply chains formed through U.S. MNEs’ 
usage of Swiss subsidiaries. As the base regression model results depict, there is a negative 
relation between the Swiss variable, which denotes whether or not a corporation has a Swiss 
subsidiary, and effective tax rate. This demonstrates that corporations with at least one Swiss 
subsidiary have lower effective tax rates than corporations without any subsidiaries in 
Switzerland. This effect was observed to a greater extent in the “Personal and Business Services” 
industry after stratifying by industry type. Notably, the average effective tax rate of firms with at 
least one Swiss subsidiary was approximately 2.80 percent lower than that of firms without 
Swiss subsidiaries. It may be reasonable to infer then that the findings of this stratified regression 
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model are the product of favorable operational and policy-related conditions that enable 
multinational service organizations to better leverage tax efficient supply chains via Swiss 
subsidiaries, which supports the aforementioned analysis made by Webber (2011). For 
manufacturing corporations, although there was reason to believe that firms with Swiss 
subsidiaries would have an average effective tax rate that is lower than that of manufacturing 
corporations without any Swiss subsidiaries, I do not find any statistically significant results. 
Thus, for firm years from 1998-2013, I conclude that the ownership of Swiss subsidiaries 
generally allows U.S. parent corporations to enjoy lower average effective tax rates, with 
variations in industry regarding the degree of these effects. 
There are numerous avenues for further research and analysis on the topic of tax efficient 
supply chain management. While unlikely, if data availability improves in the future, it would be 
highly beneficial to factor in pre-tax supply chain costs in order to form a more complete picture 
of how MNEs strategically organize global supply chains to maximize net income. Additionally, 
it would be valuable to revisit this research question and hypothesis when firm-year data 
becomes available for years following the TCJA. As described in the earlier discussion, the 
TCJA introduced changes that shifted U.S. international taxation from a hybrid-worldwide 
system to a hybrid-territorial system, providing further support for the viability of obtaining tax 
benefits from strategically organizing supply chains. Although key provisions including a GILTI 
tax, BEAT, and FDII tax were implemented to offset the impact of the participation exemption 
for dividends repatriated to U.S. parent corporations, the shift may result in a system that 
possesses incentives for MNEs to locate foreign subsidiaries in tax havens to reduce tax liability. 
Thus, evaluating the effects of the TCJA on supply chains can provide insight on how taxes, and 
tax changes, in various countries may affect firms’ supply chain management decisions in firm-
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years after 2017. Furthermore, the results of the base and manufacturing models signal that 
examining the impact of tax efficient supply chain management in other tax haven countries may 

























Variable Definition             
etr Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) effective tax rate 
(txt/PI). Set to 1 if greater than 1 and 0 if less than 0. 
Cash_ETR Cash effective tax rate (txpd/PI). Set to 1 if greater than 1 and 0 if 
less than 0.   
sale Sales/turnover (net)       
cogs Cost of goods sold       
COGS_AT Cost of goods sold divided by total assets (cogs/AT)     
xsga Selling, general, and administrative expense     
SGA_AT Selling, general, and administrative expense divided by total assets 
(xsga/AT)   
xrd Research and development expense (set to 0 if missing)      
rd Research and development expense divided by assets (xrd/AT)    
txdfo Foreign deferred tax expense      
txdi Deferred tax expense       
txfed Federal income tax expense      
txfo Foreign income tax expense      
txpd Income taxes paid       
txt Total income tax expense      
size Natural logarithm of total assets (AT)      
ppent Net property, plant, and equipment      
PPE_PCT Property, plant, and equipment divided by assets (ppent/AT)    
roa Pre-tax income divided by total assets (PI/AT)     
mnc Set to 1 if firm is multinational enterprise, and 0 otherwise. Multinational 
is indicated by a firm having foreign income (PIFO), positive txfo, or 
positive txdfo. 
Swiss Set to 1 if firm has Swiss tax haven subsidiary, and zero otherwise. From 
Scott Dyreng's website. 
NonSwiss_Haven Set to 1 if firm has non-Swiss tax haven subsidiary, and zero 
otherwise.    
NOL_Dum Set to 1 if firm has net operating loss (TLCF), and zero 
otherwise.     
manufacturingco Set to 1 if firm has a manufacturing SIC code (sich)     
sich Standard Industrial Classification (historical)     
fyear Dummy variable for firm-year observations     
FF30 Dummy variable for industry indicators, based on Fama and 
French 30 industry classification.     
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics for the firm-year sample of U.S. incorporated firms 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
         
etr 55,164 0.286 0.181 0.000 0.184 0.331 0.381 1.000 
Cash_ETR 50,763 0.251 0.230 0.000 0.057 0.230 0.355 1.000 
sale 55,218 2,807.868 12,639.610 0.541 66.790 305.117 1,315.325 46,565.000 
cogs 55,221 1,858.065 9,239.711 0.000 28.871 161.100 790.956 30,611.100 
COGS_AT 55,221 0.670 1.381 0.000 0.117 0.434 0.906 3.647 
xsga 46,161 489.739 2,280.722 0.417 14.285 56.091 222.989 8,811.000 
SGA_AT 46,161 0.291 2.272 0.006 0.057 0.187 0.349 1.307 
xrd 55,221 47.301 376.724 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.291 986.000 
rd 55,221 0.022 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.233 
txdfo 37,839 -1.045 51.972 -60.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 45.477 
txdi 46,504 9.864 302.693 -188.000 -0.691 0.039 4.540 436.000 
txfed 42,194 54.024 260.396 -34.500 0.000 2.924 22.022 982.000 
txfo 42,008 35.424 441.795 -0.388 0.000 0.000 3.600 611.000 
txpd 50,792 82.456 536.352 -14.548 0.495 4.877 28.000 1,500.000 
txt 55,217 94.980 627.206 -22.300 0.690 6.779 37.569 1,675.000 
size 55,221 6.234 2.300 0.578 4.822 6.305 7.695 11.620 
ppent 53,028 1,023.671 5,306.267 0.000 8.122 48.057 310.925 18,850.970 
PPE_PCT 53,028 0.224 0.238 0.000 0.033 0.136 0.336 0.891 
roa 55,221 0.246 7.735 0.001 0.024 0.064 0.124 0.722 
mnc 55,221 0.402 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Swiss 55,221 0.084 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NonSwiss_Haven 55,221 0.273 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 






Descriptive statistics for the firm-year sample of U.S. incorporated firms with Swiss Subsidiaries 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
         
etr 4,642 0.315 0.169 0.000 0.246 0.314 0.370 1.000 
Cash_ETR 4,554 0.286 0.219 0.000 0.146 0.251 0.351 1.000 
sale 4,643 8,740.369 21,785.580 67.698 757.414 2,060.702 6,470.600 104,286.000 
cogs 4,643 5,341.388 15,691.890 16.160 325.662 1,076.191 3823.304 76,356.000 
COGS_AT 4,643 0.578 0.596 0.022 0.253 0.470 0.733 3.147 
xsga 4,298 1,677.014 3,760.109 23.690 198.507 485.569 1,295.933 22,769.000 
SGA_AT 4,298 0.264 0.166 0.018 0.149 0.232 0.343 0.798 
xrd 4,643 273.261 905.267 0.000 0.000 32.234 142.300 5,167.000 
rd 4,643 0.040 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.060 0.210 
txdfo 4,060 6.115 100.456 -311.000 -4.246 -0.177 1.037 197.000 
txdi 4,546 7.068 340.157 -713.000 -10.187 0.261 15.878 863.000 
txfed 4,187 143.664 426.889 -116.000 2.170 21.848 100.900 1,917.000 
txfo 4,461 161.469 892.062 -0.879 5.136 18.592 61.000 2,454.000 
txpd 4,555 302.260 1,167.664 -18.731 12.900 43.696 158.092 4,250.000 
txt 4,643 339.303 1,258.584 -61.100 17.373 56.739 198.084 4,370.000 
size 4,643 7.952 1.794 4.202 6.756 7.781 9.009 13.413 
ppent 4,623 2,185.500 7,251.728 2.668 96.610 348.653 1,200.726 27,232.000 
PPE_PCT 4,623 0.183 0.143 0.005 0.781 0.149 0.241 0.685 
roa 4,643 0.101 0.085 0.002 0.046 0.085 0.136 0.353 
mnc 4,643 0.963 0.188 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NonSwiss_Haven 4,643 0.897 0.304 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 






Descriptive statistics for the firm-year sample of U.S. incorporated firms without Swiss Subsidiaries 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
         
etr 50,522 0.283 0.182 0.000 0.169 0.333 0.381 1.000 
Cash_ETR 46,209 0.248 0.230 0.000 0.048 0.226 0.356 1.000 
sale 50,575 2,263.240 11,284.330 0.403 58.547 249.354 1,037.123 37,218.000 
cogs 50,578 1,538.300 8,330.286 0.000 24.563 131.937 638.173 25,481.000 
COGS_AT 50,578 0.678 1.432 0.000 0.105 0.429 0.928 3.747 
xsga 41,863 367.844 2,030.986 0.391 12.424 44.716 162.507 6,162.000 
SGA_AT 41,863 0.294 2.386 0.006 0.048 0.178 0.351 1.346 
xrd 50,578 26.558 273.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705 462.000 
rd 50,578 0.020 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.237 
txdfo 33,779 -0.435 42.541 -29.446 0.000 0.000 0.000 28.040 
txdi 41,958 10.167 298.354 -135.000 -0.468 0.034 3.869 376.000 
txfed 38,007 44.149 232.856 -26.324 0.000 2.270 17.645 759.000 
txfo 37,547 20.449 348.903 -0.347 0.000 0.000 1.348 302.000 
txpd 46,237 60.802 420.112 -14.000 0.374 3.810 21.098 1,010.000 
txt 50,574 72.550 527.375 -19.671 0.542 5.318 29.702 1,211.000 
size 50,578 6.077 2.276 0.473 4.669 6.149 7.528 11.340 
ppent 48,405 912.708 5,067.834 0.000 6.886 38.486 243.873 17,849.000 
PPE_PCT 48,405 0.228 0.245 0.000 0.029 0.134 0.351 0.895 
roa 50,578 0.259 8.082 0.001 0.023 0.062 0.123 0.777 
mnc 50,578 0.351 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
NonSwiss_Haven 50,578 0.215 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 












    
Swiss -0.0101*   -0.0280*   0.0037 
 0 0.01 0.01 
NonSwiss_Haven -0.0133*** -0.0008 -0.0222*** 
 0 0.01 0.01 
size 0.0148*** 0.0269*** 0.0153*** 
 0 0 0 
roa -0.0003**  0 0 
 0 0 0 
NOL_Dum -0.0245*** -0.0339*** -0.0366*** 
 0 0.01 0 
mnc 0.0327*** 0.0206*   0.0232*** 
 0 0.01 0.01 
PPE_PCT 0.0066 0.0409 0.0697*** 
 0.01 0.02 0.02 
rd -0.0197 -0.0159 -0.0196 
 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Constant 0.2407*** 0.1670*** 0.1881*** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No No 
N 52,975 5,977 13,207 
Adj. R2 0.0838 0.1170 0.0762 
 
Notes: 
Cluster robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient. 
* Significant at 0.05 level (p < 0.05) 
** Significant at 0.01 level (p < 0.01) 






Results of COGS divided by total assets regression analysis 
Variable COGS_AT Model (5) 
  
Swiss -0.0886**  
 0.03 






NOL_Dum 0.0618**  
 0.02 









Adj. R2 0.3879 
Notes: 
Cluster robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient. 
* Significant at 0.05 level (p < 0.05) 
** Significant at 0.01 level (p < 0.01) 








Results of SG&A divided by total assets regression 
analysis 
Variable SGA_AT Model (6) 
  

















Adj. R2 0.1491 
 
Notes: 
Cluster robust standard errors are presented below each coefficient. 
* Significant at 0.05 level (p < 0.05) 
** Significant at 0.01 level (p < 0.01) 
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